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Abstract 
Concerns about hindsight in the law typically arise with 
regard to the bias that outcome knowledge can produce. But a 
more difficult problem than the clear view that hindsight appears 
to provide is the blind spot that it actually has. Because of the 
conventional wisdom about error review, there is a missed 
opportunity to ensure meaningful scrutiny. Beyond the 
confirmation biases that make convictions seem inevitable lies the 
question whether courts can see what they are meant to assess 
when they do look closely for error. Standards that require a 
retrospective showing of materiality, prejudice, or harm turn on 
what a judge imagines would have happened at trial under 
different circumstances. The interactive nature of the fact-finding 
process, however, means that the effect of error can rarely be 
assessed with confidence. Moreover, changing paradigms in 
criminal procedure scholarship make accuracy and error 
correction newly paramount. The empirical evidence of known 
innocents found guilty in the criminal justice system is mounting, 
and many of those wrongful convictions endured because errors 
were reviewed under hindsight standards. New insights about the 
cognitive psychology of decision-making, taken together with this 
heightened awareness of error, suggest that it is time to reevaluate 
some thresholds for reversal. The problem of hindsight blindness 
is particularly evident in the rules concerning the discovery of 
exculpatory evidence, the adequacy of defense counsel, and the 
harmfulness of erroneous rulings at trial. The standards applied 
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in each of those contexts share a common flaw: a barrier between 
the mechanism for evaluation and the source of error. This essay 
concludes that reviewing courts should consider the trial that 
actually occurred rather than what “might have been” in a 
different proceeding and proposes some new vocabulary for 
weighing error. 
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I. Introduction 
Constitutional requirements and standards of review that 
turn on hindsight warrant reconsideration in light of both recent 
social science on decision-making and empirical advances about 
error in the criminal justice process. For example, hindsight 
pervades the operation of the Brady rule governing prosecutors’ 
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due process obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence,1 the 
Strickland standard for assessing the adequacy of defense 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment,2 and the question whether 
certain constitutional and evidentiary errors at trial require 
reversal.3 While these standards have long been critiqued,4 
recent scholarship on reliability that DNA-based exonerations 
made possible substantially reinforces the claim.5 Wrongful 
convictions occur, in significant numbers, and the adversarial 
orientation of police and prosecutors frequently precludes 
self-correction.6 Other avenues for ensuring accuracy thus merit 
closer scrutiny, including the interstices where courts review 
claims of error and consider reversing convictions. As cognizance 
of wrongful convictions has grown, interest has increased in the 
mechanisms of error correction and the safety valve that 
appellate courts could provide.7 
The manner in which courts evaluate the reliability of 
adjudication has also been illuminated by social science on the 
                                                                                                     
 1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
 3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994) (stating that convictions shall not be 
reversed for “errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties”).  
 4. See Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: 
The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 645 (2002) (“[I]f 
Brady provides a sense of security that defendants are constitutionally entitled 
to broad discovery, that sense of security is a false one.”); see also Donald A. 
Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 883, 899 (2013) (“Strickland has been 
the subject of sustained academic criticism since it came down.”); Brandon L. 
Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 
2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 39 (“[T]he Court has shifted the evidentiary burden of 
proving error not harmless to criminal defendants by incorporating harmless 
error rules into the context of fair trial rights.”). 
 5. See generally, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 55 (2008) (providing one of the earliest systematic looks at the first 200 
cases in which DNA evidence exonerated defendants). 
 6. See generally George C. Thomas III, The Criminal Procedure Road Not 
Taken: Due Process and the Protection of Innocence, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169 
(2005); Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549. 
 7. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. 
L.J. 481, 481 (2009) (“After the exoneration of more than 200 people based on 
post-conviction DNA evidence, a growing movement against wrongful 
convictions has called increased attention to the prosecutorial suppression of 
material exculpatory evidence.”). 
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unfolding of facts, the structure of decision-making, and the 
inevitability of biases.8 In light of those developments, requiring 
assessments of what “might have been” appears to leave a barrier 
between reviewing courts and the root causes of error. 
Underenforcement of discovery obligations, the right to counsel, 
and exclusionary rules diminishes accuracy. And that 
underenforcement occurs in part because hindsight standards 
both preclude relief in individual cases9 and impede reform.10 
Each of these standards has been revealed as having inconsistent 
application and insufficient rigor,11 and each suffers from a 
similar disability. New vocabulary to discuss the weight of error 
could help strike the balance between meaningful review and an 
administrable reversal rate. 
II. Finding the Blind Spot in Hindsight 
Even as the incarceration rate attracts bipartisan 
attention,12 and scrutiny of investigative practices has given rise 
to conviction integrity units in prosecutors’ offices,13 the role of 
judges considering trial errors continues to contract because of 
habeas barriers and hindsight standards. Two developments in 
the scholarship on criminal trials have brought into sharp relief 
the problems with hindsight and this missed opportunity for 
                                                                                                     
 8. See generally Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001). 
 9. See Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (stating that the harmless error standard “create[s] a firewall 
between constitutional rights and remedies”). 
 10. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But Not Always Harmless: 
When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1995) 
(“When we hold errors harmless, the rights of individuals, both constitutional 
and otherwise, go unenforced . . . [and] the deterrent force of a reversal remains 
unfelt by those who cause the error.”).  
 11. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1533, 1544 (2010) (“Scholars have repeatedly condemned Brady’s materiality 
standard, often on the premise that it all too easily empowers overzealous 
prosecutors to engage in gamesmanship to dodge their obligations to disclose.”). 
 12. Carl Hulse & Jennifer Steinhauer, Sentencing Overhaul Proposed in 
Senate with Bipartisan Backing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2015, at A19. 
 13. See generally, e.g., CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, CONVICTION 
INTEGRITY UNITS: VANGUARD OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2014). 
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more rigorous review: insights from cognitive psychology about 
the way in which evidence is received,14 and new data on 
wrongful convictions.15 Jurors reach verdicts according to a 
complex process, and they respond to evidence in part through 
unconscious biases that elide analysis.16 Moreover, the strength 
of any piece of evidence cannot be evaluated in isolation because 
its weight and meaning arise from its relationship to other 
evidence. A clearer understanding of the way in which 
fact-finders make decisions reveals the impossibility of correctly 
evaluating a completed trial in hindsight. At the same time, 
greater awareness of the distribution of error at trial underscores 
the need for a tighter safety net to catch prosecutors’ discovery 
violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and wrongfully 
admitted evidence.  
A. Unpredictable Evidentiary Interactions 
Experimental psychology has established that fact-finders do 
not engage in an atomistic weighing of probabilities at trial; they 
react to the evidence as a whole, in an integrated and non-linear 
process.17 Trials involve partial stories, intricate constellations of 
facts dim and bright, complex decision-making by counsel about 
strategy and presentation, and testimony that flows into other 
                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE PROCESS 170 (2012) (describing how “persuasion is often dominated by 
heuristic, superficial cues” including “associations, similarities, metaphors, 
emotive appeals, and narrative ploys” and concluding that factfinders place 
greater weight on these than on “analytic inferences that can be sustained by 
the evidence”). 
 15. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION 
COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012). 
 16. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror 
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 542 (1991) 
(analyzing an experiment with mock jurors that demonstrated that “story 
coherence, as determined by presentation order of evidence, affects verdict 
decisions in a dramatic way”).  
 17. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trial, 101 GEO. L. J. 281, 
295 (2013) (explaining that “jurors have preexisting conceptions that affect how 
they process evidence, and that individual pieces of evidence interact with each 
other in ways that influence meaning”).  
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pieces of evidence the moment it emerges.18 Preexisting narrative 
constructs further affect how fact-finders receive and process 
information.19 Verdicts are thus an interactive process, in which 
pieces of evidence alter each other when they come together,20 
and fact-finders themselves can change course through 
deliberation with other jurors.  
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the sum of all of the 
evidence and argument at trial creates a new whole.21 In Old 
Chief v. United States, the Court reasoned that the government 
could present a narrative case “to convince the jurors that a 
guilty verdict would be morally reasonable as much as to point to 
the discrete elements of a defendant’s legal fault.”22 And in 
Bruton v. United States,23 the Court stated that jurors cannot 
“segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes.”24 
Given the interdependence of evidence, it is both difficult to 
understand what actually happened at a trial and all but 
impossible to envision what might have happened at some 
slightly different trial. The “legal truth” might not have been a 
guilty verdict with additional impeachment material on key 
                                                                                                     
 18. See United States v. Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(“The jury’s evaluation of the evidence relevant to a material proposition 
requires a gestalt or synthesis which seldom needs to be analyzed 
precisely . . . [and] must be interpreted in the context of all the evidence 
introduced.”); see also ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 150 (1999) 
(“Stories solve the problem of information overload by allowing a continuing 
reintegration of new information and reorganization of that information 
according to the changes in meaning that the new information allows or 
requires.”); SIMON, supra note 14, at 175 (discussing the coherence effect and 
“bidirectional reasoning, in which the facts guide the conclusion, while the 
emergence of that conclusion reshapes the facts to become more coherent with 
it”). 
 19. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 116 
(2000) (considering the way in which narrative constructs reach the unconscious 
and influence the perception of facts); see also Mark Kelman, Interpretive 
Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 593–96 
(1981) (articulating the theory that narrative forms not only how facts are 
perceived at trial but also what those facts actually “are”).  
 20. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) (“Evidence 
thus has force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning . . . .”).  
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 188. 
 23. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
 24. Id. at 131.  
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prosecution witnesses, a superior defense lawyer, or the exclusion 
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence like a coerced confession. 
It is hard to say. One cannot step in the same river twice.25 And 
courts cannot accurately reconstruct or redirect the ebb and flow 
of a completed trial.  
Yet that reconstruction is precisely what hindsight standards 
demand: a clear vision of an error-free trial that did not occur. On 
direct appeal, or on state or federal habeas, judges are asked to 
imagine a different trial than the one that took place. They must 
then characterize the effect that the other, fictional trial would 
have had on the initial fact-finders. The difficulty—if not 
impossibility—of this task is compounded by the simple fact that 
trials tend to occur in close cases with complex fact-finding. When 
reviewing courts apply standards to those trials that require 
hindsight, many errors evade scrutiny. 
B. Bias v. Blindness 
This blind spot presents different issues than the 
well-documented problem of “hindsight bias.” Hindsight bias 
makes past events seem inevitable and clearly predictable after 
they have actually unfolded.26 Decision-makers cannot suppress 
the influence of known results on judgments but remain largely 
unaware that outcome knowledge has altered their perception.27 
                                                                                                     
 25. This is a saying widely attributed to early Greek philosopher 
Heraclitus. See Daniel W. Graham, Heraclitus, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2011) (“It is not possible to step twice into the 
same river according to Heraclitus, or to come into contact twice with a mortal 
being in the same state.”).  
 26. See Doron Teichman, The Hindsight Bias and the Law in Hindsight, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 354 (Doron 
Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds., 2014) (providing an overview of the intersection 
between the psychological literature on hindsight and legal scholarship); see also 
Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (discussing how knowledge of a 
result affects the way an individual perceives past decisions); Baruch Fischhoff, 
Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under 
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPER. PSYCHOL. 288, 293 (1975) (documenting the existence of 
hindsight bias). See generally Jay Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian 
Wilhalm, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. 
DECISION PROCESSES 147 (1991) (recounting several studies of hindsight bias).  
 27. Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past 
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Memory is a dynamic process, and awareness of a result 
highlights evidence and information consistent with that result, 
which makes the outcome appear much more likely at the earlier 
point in time. Belief perseverance can then make judges doubt 
the significance of facts that conflict with the status quo of a 
conviction.28 This bias in favor of the known outcome partially 
explains the durability of wrongful convictions, sometimes even 
after new evidence like DNA exonerates a defendant.29 In a 
broader sense, the confirmatory impulse known as hindsight bias 
“leads investigators, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers 
alike to focus on a particular conclusion and then filter all 
evidence in a case through the lens provided by that 
conclusion.”30  
Some legal judgments already recognize this hindsight 
danger and reflect adjustments for the potential bias.31 This 
explains why, for example, after-acquired information is 
generally barred from liability determinations.32 And it also 
figures in the assessment of whether an unnecessarily suggestive 
identification process infected an eyewitness’s testimony.33 The 
                                                                                                     
Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 322 (1990); see 
also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 202 (2011) (noting that 
winning teams later appear much stronger than losing ones and that this new 
perception alters the “view of the past as well as of the future”). 
 28. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 27, at 81 (describing experiments 
showing the difficulty of “unbelieving” falsehoods); id. at 305 (“Loss aversion is a 
powerful conservative force that favors minimal changes from the status quo in 
the lives of both institutions and individuals.”). 
 29. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of 
Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 316 (discussing 
notorious cases of enduring wrongful convictions and the mechanisms by which 
the guilt judgment “persisted on appeal and through postconviction proceedings, 
tainting perspectives on the relative strength of the States’ and defendants’ 
cases”). 
 30. Id. at 292. 
 31. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in 
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 591, 620–24 (1998) (“When a court must 
determine what someone ‘knew or should have known,’ it is especially likely to 
fall prey to the hindsight bias.”). 
 32. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (barring admission of evidence concerning 
subsequent remedial measures to prove negligence, culpable conduct, defective 
design, or the need for a warning). 
 33. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (listing the factors 
that determine admissibility of identification testimony). 
HINDSIGHT BLIND SPOTS 173 
phenomenon of 20/20 hindsight of course relates as well to 
failures to overturn error.34 But even though confirmatory bias 
obstructs meaningful review of inadequacies in the criminal 
justice process, it is not the primary obstacle.  
Blindness rather than bias may be the most significant 
impediment to review. When courts must determine whether a 
decision-making process was sound despite an exposed error, the 
hindsight they employ appears to offer a clear view but too often 
is clouded. Courts can only speculate about the effect of error, and 
it turns out that many errors they have deemed trivial may be 
contributing to wrongful convictions. 
C. The Error-Correction Imperative 
Empirical evidence now reveals that hindsight standards 
jeopardize not just the legitimacy of the finding of legal truth but 
the accuracy of the “factual truth” as well.35 Until recently, the 
Supreme Court only rarely expressed any doubt “that a person 
awarded the constitutional protections and found guilty by a jury 
of peers might be anything but factually guilty.”36 But in recent 
scholarship made possible by DNA exonerations, the analysis of 
wrongful convictions has established a significant population of 
“known innocents” in the criminal justice system.37 That 
development has shifted the criminal procedure paradigm in 
terms of the primacy of accuracy. Error leading to wrongful 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Findley & Scott, supra note 29, at 321 (“With hindsight knowledge 
that a jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, judges are 
likely to be predisposed to view the conviction as both inevitable and a sound 
decision, despite a procedural or constitutional error in the proceedings.”).  
 35. See GARRETT, supra note 15, at 200–04 (noting that hundreds of cases 
involving post-conviction exonerations through DNA evidence included a review 
on direct appeal in which errors were deemed inconsequential or evidence of 
guilt overwhelming). 
 36. Dan Simon, Criminal Law at the Crossroads: Turn to Accuracy, 87 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 421, 426 (2014); see also United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Judge Learned Hand) (referring to the wrongfully convicted 
defendant as a “ghost” haunting the criminal justice process like an “unreal 
dream”). 
 37. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 37 (“Over the past decade, DNA 
technology challenged the Court’s assumption of guilt with the postconviction 
exoneration of mounting numbers of innocent people.”). 
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convictions is now real rather than theoretical, and the debate no 
longer involves speculation about the tolerable ratio of guilty 
acquittals to unjust convictions.38  
Moreover, accounts of wrongful convictions increasingly 
reach popular culture,39 and the criminal justice system’s 
“potential to convict and punish innocent people” has entered the 
broader public consciousness.40 The recent phenomenon of the 
“Serial” podcast, for example, alerted millions of listeners to the 
sometimes murky narrative that emerges in a criminal trial and 
the difficult process of pairing factual and legal truth.41  
Though reliability has been called the “largely forgotten 
purpose of the rules,”42 the confirmed incidence of “actual 
innocence” demands consideration of how particular practices 
might relate to correct outcomes.43 The actual rate of false 
convictions remains unknowable.44 DNA identification is not 
                                                                                                     
 38. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
358 (1765) (“Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[A] fundamental value determination of our society is that it is far 
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”); Alexander 
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PENN. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (discussing the 
Blackstone Ratio). 
 39. See generally, e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN: MURDER AND 
INJUSTICE IN A SMALL TOWN (2006); JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANNINO, RONALD 
COTTON & ERIN TOMEO, PICKING COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND 
REDEMPTION (2009). 
 40. Simon, supra note 36, at 428; see also Medwed, supra note 6, at 1551 
(stating that the focus on innocence “by litigators, academics, legislators, 
authors, and even television executives signals a new era in which fact-based 
arguments surrounding guilt or innocence may begin to trump or at least hold 
their own with the traditional rights-based arguments that have been the norm 
in criminal law for generations”).  
 41. See, e.g., Matt Schiavenza, Serial’s Second Act, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 8, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/02/serials-second-act/ 
385287/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2015) (noting defendant Adnan Syed’s pending 
appeal on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 42. Richard Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back in: False Confessions and 
Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 486. 
 43. See Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: 
How the Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 133, 134, 147 (2008) (discussing the “Reliability Model” that 
emerges from the “Innocence Movement”). 
 44. Adam Liptak, Consensus on Counting the Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at A14. But see Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) 
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available in every case, and many serious crimes do not involve 
the collection of DNA evidence.45 But it is now apparent that 
more (and more egregious) errors occur in the criminal justice 
system than previously thought. The National Registry of 
Exonerations documents 1,733 wrongful convictions that have 
been exposed to date.46 There have been 330 exonerations 
obtained through post-conviction DNA testing, including twenty 
defendants who had been sentenced to death.47 Further, despite 
rhetoric about the potential costs of wrongful acquittals 
stemming from more rigorous procedures, there is no identifiable 
population of “known guilties” who are wrongly acquitted to 
compare to the growing dataset containing known innocents.48 As 
Brandon Garrett has explained, “[C]onstitutional error no longer 
appears as a procedural technicality asserted by a probably guilty 
defendant.”49  
                                                                                                     
(Scalia, J., concurring) (extrapolating from editorial and empirical challenges to 
the existence of wrongful convictions to conclude that the error rate is actually 
0.027%). 
 45. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531 (2005) (“Beneath the 
surface there are other undetected miscarriages of justice in rape cases without 
testable DNA, and a much larger group of undetected false convictions in 
robberies and other serious crimes of violence for which DNA identification is 
useless.”); see also Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and 
Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on 
Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 938 (2008) (“There are very few 
exonerations among convictions for nonhomicidal crimes of violence for which 
DNA evidence is of no value, for example, robbery.”).  
 46. National Registry of Exonerations, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCHOOL, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 47. Cases: DNA Exoneree Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases-false-imprisonment/front-
page#c10=published&b_start= 0&c4+Exonerated+by+DNA (last visited Oct. 11, 
2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 48. Nor are the costs of false convictions and false acquittals properly 
viewed as “fixed quantities to be weighed against each other.” Daniel Epps, The 
Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1093 (2015). 
But see Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and the Costs of 
Error: Or, Is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, 1 
OXFORD STUD. PHIL. L. 195, 202 (2011) (attempting to quantify the cost of false 
acquittals). 
 49. Garrett, supra note 5, at 38. 
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Accuracy, of course, is not the sole purpose or single-minded 
focus of criminal adjudication. It serves other goals and 
aspirations, including procedural fairness, individual autonomy, 
privacy and privileged relationships, and even the correction of 
some power disparities between the state and citizens.50 The 
“new reliability” scholarship, however, has brought correct 
outcomes to the forefront.51 It inspires discussion of best practices 
for investigators,52 underscores the scientific shortcomings of 
some common forensic analyses,53 and exposes the informational 
and resource asymmetries that can preclude true adversarial 
testing. 
 Yet the renewed imperative to achieve accurate results 
seems at odds with the limited avenues for error correction at 
later stages of criminal adjudication. Although Brady and 
Strickland claims of error were designed to trigger reversal only 
in a narrow band of cases, they were not intended to prevent any 
review at all.54 To be sure, there is a “strong aversion of appellate 
and post-conviction courts to intervene in factual determinations 
made at the trial level,”55 but the rules have no force if frontline 
institutional actors know that conduct is completely insulated 
from review.56 The understanding that once error occurs, it will 
                                                                                                     
 50. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in 
Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 183, 211 (2014) (“Adjudication’s traditional 
purposes and rationales have been predominantly non-utilitarian. 
Constitutional rights to introduce evidence and confront state witnesses serve 
political norms that value individual autonomy and process participation, 
independent of whether they improve accuracy in trial judgments.”). 
 51. Findley, supra note 43, at 134; Medwed, supra note 11, at 1550. 
 52. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo et al., Promoting Accuracy in the Use of 
Confession Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to 
Prevent Wrongful Convictions, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 799, 805–06 (2013) 
(arguing for complete recording of interrogations and for pretrial reliability 
hearings to determine whether confessions are contaminated). 
 53. See Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False 
Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
721, 721 (2007) (stating that criminal adjudication has “relied too readily upon 
faulty forensic evidence like handwriting, ballistics, and hair and fiber 
analysis”).  
 54. See generally Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 55. SIMON, supra note 14, at 212. 
 56. See Gregory Mitchell, Against “Overwhelming” Appellate Activism: 
Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1335, 1366 (1994) (“[I]f 
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rarely be rectified, has led to the recent establishment of 
conviction integrity units to review potential errors,57 and those 
reviews have in turn informed investigative and prosecutorial 
tactics in ongoing investigations.58  
Nonetheless, executive self-correction still happens 
infrequently, and hindsight blindness should not preclude courts 
from engaging in guided speculation about the impact of errors. 
Reforms to date have focused largely on investigators and 
prosecutors rather than reviewing courts.59 Yet there are now 
hundreds of cases that reveal the relationship between errors 
that were not fully assessed and persistent false convictions.60 As 
applied, the current standards are afflicted by hindsight 
blindness that can preclude the necessary holistic inquiry. And 
this is especially concerning when the errors that appellate courts 
are weighing involve practices that have long been understood as 
related to accurate adjudication, such as the discovery of 
exculpatory material or the adequacy of defense counsel. 
III. Weighing Exculpatory Evidence 
To begin with discovery obligations, due process imposes a 
duty on prosecutors to turn over exculpatory information in the 
possession of the government. Under Brady v. Maryland,61 
evidence favorable to an accused is discoverable if it is “material 
                                                                                                     
committing an error has no adverse effect on the state, the deterrence of official 
misbehavior becomes difficult.”). 
 57. Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Prosecutors Create Unit to Find Wrongful 
Convictions, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/crime/dc-prosecutors-create-unit-to-find-wrongful-
convictions/2014/09/11/91a3722c-39da-11e4-bdfb-de4104544a37_story.html (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. See CTR. FOR PROSECUTION INTEGRITY, supra note 13 (discussing the 
effectiveness of conviction integrity units across the United States). 
 59. Supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.  
 60. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen: 
Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 623 (2013) 
(discussing the courts’ failure to value the cumulative effect of multiple small 
exclusions like circumstantial evidence of non-matches between a perpetrator 
and the defendant). 
 61. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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either to guilt or to punishment.”62 Evidence is material if there 
is a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed 
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”63 The standard is not just the lens through which the 
court looks upon post-conviction review but the definition of the 
government’s due process obligation. Almost every court, as well 
as the Department of Justice, interpret the discovery requirement 
itself as extending only to material evidence.64 The definition of 
material thus gives prosecutors flexibility—and causes reviewing 
courts difficulty—because it is a hindsight decision as to whether 
the suppression of evidence “undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.”65  
A. Hindsight About Foresight 
The question starts out as one of foresight rather than 
hindsight. Foresight is a familiar construct in decision-making 
within the criminal justice process by investigators, prosecutors, 
and judges. To take just a few examples, probable cause to seek a 
search warrant, make an arrest, or charge a crime requires a 
prediction about the evidence that will be found or the likelihood 
of guilt.66 Judges also routinely evaluate the admissibility of 
                                                                                                     
 62. Id. at 87. 
 63. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). 
 64. Bruce A. Green, Federal Criminal Discovery Reform: A Legislative 
Approach, 64 MERCER L. REV. 639, 646 (2013). For examples from lower courts 
that have imposed broader discovery requirements, see United States v. 
Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he government must always 
produce any potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without 
regard to how the withholding of such evidence might be viewed—with the 
benefit of hindsight—as affecting the outcome of the trial.”); United States v. 
Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005) (“Simply because ‘material’ 
failures to disclose exculpatory evidence violate due process does not mean only 
‘material’ disclosures are required.”); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“T]he post-trial review determines only whether the 
improper suppression of evidence violated the defendant’s due process rights. 
However, that the suppression may not have been sufficient to violate due 
process does not mean that it was proper.”). 
 65. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
 66. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (defining 
probable cause as “where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ 
knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information, are 
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evidence by assessing what effect it might have on a jury.67 But a 
Brady claim adds a challenging layer. Not only must the 
prosecutor show foresight to comply, but the judge then uses 
hindsight about that foresight to determine whether there has 
been a violation.68 The limitations of hindsight already inhibit the 
evaluation whether a particular failure to disclose could have 
altered the course of a now-completed trial, and judges further 
consider whether a prosecutor would have anticipated the 
hypothetical course change at the time that the evidence was 
withheld. 
Prosecutors acting in bad faith can find shelter behind this 
layered standard, and even those acting in good faith cannot 
apply it consistently. They interpret facts within their 
adversarial role, and potentially exculpatory evidence may not 
undermine their confidence in the defendant’s guilt. Indeed, 
prosecutors are supposed to be convinced of a defendant’s guilt 
before seeking charges and thus necessarily engage with the 
Brady standard through a lens clouded by cognitive bias.69 
Exculpatory evidence will of course appear meaningless or 
unconvincing, and the materiality element makes it easy to 
suppress. Starting out with an adversarial view of the case and 
                                                                                                     
sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a man of reasonable caution that 
a crime is being committed”).  
 67. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (giving trial courts discretion to exclude evidence 
where its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect). 
 68. See Green, supra note 64, at 646 (“[A] federal prosecutor who seeks 
merely to abide by the constitutional minimum must predict before trial what a 
court will say after trial about the utility of favorable evidence in the 
[G]overnment’s possession.” (emphasis added)). The “inevitable discovery” 
doctrine applicable to the Fourth Amendment provides an analogue, according 
to which law enforcement, in possession of evidence after an illegal search, can 
argue that the evidence should not be suppressed because the investigation 
would eventually have uncovered that evidence. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 
431, 444 (1984) (adopting the inevitable discovery exception).  
 69. Burke, supra note 7, at 494–96; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving 
Prosecutorial Decision-Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593–1601 (2006) (explaining how confirmation bias, 
selective information processing, belief perseverance, and avoiding cognitive 
dissonance affect prosecutorial decision-making); KEITH A. FINDLEY & BARBARA 
O’BRIEN, PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES: COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING 36 
(2014) (“[P]eople interpret information, form questions, and search for 
additional evidence in a way that supports existing beliefs without even 
knowing that they are doing so.”). 
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then attempting to determine ex ante what the import of a piece 
of evidence might turn out to be is extremely difficult.70  
It is then all but impossible for courts to critique that 
decision ex post. Courts must look back at the trial and consider 
whether suppressed evidence would have changed the outcome, 
and whether, in retrospect, it appears that prosecutors should 
have prospectively recognized the value and relevance of the 
evidence at issue. Even evidence that does not clearly call the 
conviction into question might have mitigated blame or modified 
the jury’s perception of other evidence. Meaning is produced from 
the interaction between pieces of evidence and other facts and 
argument in the case, as well as preexisting narrative schemes to 
which individual fact-finders have been exposed.71 Missing 
details may matter a great deal, and “true-but-incomplete 
account[s]” may seriously mislead.72 As Justice Marshall wrote in 
Bagley,73 the “private whys and wherefores of jury deliberations 
pose an impenetrable barrier to our ability to know just which 
piece of information might make, or might have made, a 
difference.”74 Accordingly, there is no way to evaluate whether a 
prosecutor’s forecast of the effect any one piece of evidence might 
have on a trial fell short. Yet most scholarship and reform 
initiatives focused on Brady violations address whether to expand 
                                                                                                     
 70. As Scott Sundby points out, there may even be an inherently unethical 
quality to Brady compliance under the current stringent materiality standard. A 
prosecutor only need turn over a piece of evidence if she concludes that it is “so 
exculpatory in nature that it actually undermines [her] belief that a guilty 
verdict would be worthy of confidence.” Sundby, supra note 4, at 651. But 
having turned it over, she is supposed to resume “zealous efforts to obtain a 
guilty verdict” that she has just concluded would not be worthy of confidence. Id.  
 71. See Dan Simon, The Limited Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. 
L. REV. 143, 198 (2011) (“[E]vidence is likewise influenced by the other evidence 
in the case, [even] absent any rational connection between the items.”); Robert 
P. Burns, A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2008) (“[A] single additional detail, and 
certainly a constellation of additional details, can substantially change the 
significance of the stories told at trial.”). 
 72. Susan Haack, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth, 32 MIDWEST 
STUD. PHIL. 20, 30 (2008); see also id. at 31 (explaining that “the effect of telling 
only part of the truth” can be “to slant or skew the audience’s perception of the 
larger truth that is not told”).  
 73. 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
 74. Id. at 682. 
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prosecutorial obligations and mechanisms to ensure compliance,75 
rather than the approach that courts should take to determine 
whether there has been a violation. 
B. The Example of Impeachment 
Perhaps the most challenging factual context is the question 
of impeachment evidence under Brady. Giglio v. United States76 
requires that prosecutors provide defendants with any material 
evidence that tends to impeach the credibility of government 
witnesses.77 But the significance of impeachment material will 
not strike every institutional actor and fact-finder in the same 
way.78 As with exculpatory information, “it is the job of the 
defense, not the prosecution, to decide whether and in what way 
to use” impeachment.79 Layers of inference determine the 
potential import of impeachment material such as prior 
inconsistent statements, incentives to cooperate with the 
government, substance abuse and mental health issues, or 
potential animosity toward a defendant. Its exculpatory force will 
depend on which witnesses ultimately testify, how pivotal their 
testimony will be, whether impeaching them will successfully 
diminish their credibility in the eyes of fact-finders, and the 
significance of the impeached testimony in the context of other 
evidence in the case. Moreover, exposing one untrustworthy 
                                                                                                     
 75. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(2015) (summarizing scholarship on Brady reform that calls for a broader scope 
to the obligation, more sanctions for violations, or improved organizational 
dynamics within prosecuting offices).  
 76. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
 77. See id. (extending the Brady obligation to disclose favorable evidence to 
“any understanding or agreement” concerning a testifying witness’s future 
prosecution). Disclosure of impeachment material is not, however, mandatory at 
the plea bargaining stage where most crucial decisions are made. United States 
v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). 
 78. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (recognizing a defendant’s 
constitutional right “to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole 
triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the 
reliability of the witness”). 
 79. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 698 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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witness might diminish and detract from the prosecution’s case 
overall,80 but to an unpredictable extent.  
For instance, in United States v. Bagley,81 the prosecution 
failed to reveal payments that government witnesses received in 
exchange for cooperation.82 While rather obviously impeachment 
material, that evidence may or may not have made any difference 
in the case if it had been disclosed. The judges reviewing the case 
reached no consensus themselves on whether the suppressed 
material was significant.83 In a self-contained demonstration of 
the hollowness of the materiality standard, the district court 
concluded that the impeachment material was not subject to 
disclosure, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, and the Supreme Court 
reversed.84 More recently, in Smith v. Cain,85 the prosecutor 
insisted at oral argument, to an increasingly incredulous Court, 
that inconsistent statements by the only eyewitness were not 
necessarily material to the case.86  
Another illustration comes from a 2013 Ninth Circuit case 
involving a conviction for producing the chemical ricin for use as 
a weapon.87 Prosecutors failed to reveal that the forensic science 
at the heart of the government’s case was prepared by an analyst 
who had been found “incompetent and [had] committed gross 
misconduct.”88 The court concluded, however, that the 
defendant’s intent—based on web sites he had visited, notes he 
took, and books he bought—was so clearly established that 
knowledge of the scientist’s discharge would not have changed 
the outcome.89 In dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc, 
                                                                                                     
 80. See SIMON, supra note 14, at 176 (“[D]iscrediting an evidence item 
results in the weakening of other evidence items supporting the same side.”). 
 81. 473 U.S. at 667. 
 82. Id. at 682. 
 83. Id. at 684. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012). 
 86. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 
(2012) (No. 10-8145) (statement of Justice Ginsburg) (“But how could it not be 
material? Here is the only eyewitness. . . . Are you really urging that the prior 
statements were immaterial?”). 
 87. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 627 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 89. Id. at 633. 
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Judge Kozinski wrote that there is no difference between this 
analysis and concluding that it is “possible” that the defendant 
would have been convicted anyway.90 
C. The Problem with Materiality 
The Court has long sowed this confusion about whether the 
omitted evidence itself must raise reasonable doubt to be 
material, or whether some scenario under which it might have 
interacted with other evidence to trigger a different course of 
events suffices.91 Not surprisingly, the lower courts have 
articulated the level of certainty about outcome effect in a variety 
of ways.92 The easier question—because the answer is almost 
always “no”—is whether a defendant can prove that the result 
would have been different, and that seems to be the 
burden-shifting inquiry in which most courts engage.93 Judges 
are predisposed to view a conviction as correct, and that cognitive 
bias is compounded by the structural characteristics of the Brady 
standard. 
Not only the epistemic challenges but also the innocence 
empirics support reform of that standard. Discovery under Brady 
serves the “general goal of establishing procedures under which 
criminal defendants are acquitted or convicted on the basis of all 
                                                                                                     
 90. Id. at 630. 
 91. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112–13 (1976) (“[T]he omission 
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable 
doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is 
no justification for a new trial.”). 
 92. For example, among the thirty-seven federal districts with a local rule 
or order governing Brady, nineteen attempt a definition of Brady material, and 
five state that materiality is irrelevant to its application. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS: RULES, 
ORDERS AND POLICIES: REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (2007); see also Robert 
Hochman, Brady v. Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1673, 1679 (1996) (“Left to their own devices, lower courts are in 
disarray over the precise scope of Brady duties and the proper rationales behind 
them.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 441 (1995) (“In this case, 
disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel would have made a 
different result reasonably probable.”). 
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the evidence which exposes the truth.”94 In general terms, 
thorough disclosure of potentially exculpatory information 
preserves the burden of proof, enables the assistance of counsel, 
and supports other fairness guarantees.95 More specifically, 
Brandon Garrett’s study of wrongful convictions concludes that 
“in thirty-four percent of all exonerations, police suppressed 
exculpatory evidence, and prosecutors did so in thirty-seven 
percent of all exonerations.”96  
Some of those cases involve deliberate suppression of 
evidence. The Brady standard gets substantial attention for 
enabling strategic behavior by prosecutors, and recent 
scholarship has focused on compliance issues.97 But high profile 
cases—such as those concerning abuses in the New Orleans 
District Attorney’s Office,98 or the alleged excesses of the federal 
prosecutions of Senator Stevens99 or W.R. Grace100—do not 
                                                                                                     
 94. Id. at 440 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 900–01 (1984)). 
 95. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair 
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”). 
 96. Garrett, supra note 5, at 69 n.173. 
 97. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the 
Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2090 (2010) (stating that Brady 
violations are “one of the most common types of prosecutorial misconduct”). 
 98. See generally Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012); Connick v. 
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 99. In the 2009 Stevens case, the Department of Justice dismissed a public 
corruption indictment because of discovery violations, including the failure to 
disclose prior statements by a government witness that impeached his 
testimony. Charlie Savage & Michael S. Schmidt, Inner Workings of Senator’s 
Troubled Trial Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2012, at A19; see also Prosecution 
of Senator Ted Stevens, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS (NACDL), 
https://www.nacdl.org/criminaldefense.aspx?id=23885 (last visited Oct. 29, 
2015) (“Senator Ted Stevens was prosecuted and convicted for criminal ethics 
violations, subsequently lost his re-election campaign, and, only shortly before 
his tragic passing, was exonerated after a whistleblower revealed that 
prosecutors withheld critical evidence of the Senator’s innocence in violation of 
his constitutional rights.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 100. When the jury was instructed that the government similarly failed to 
disclose witness statements, that instruction apparently contributed to the 2009 
acquittal of W.R. Grace and three of its former executives who had been charged 
with environmental crimes. United States v. W.R. Grace, 455 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 
1178 (D. Mont. 2006); Kirk Johnson, Asbestos Prosecution Results in Acquittals, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A10. In the wake of these cases, the Department of 
Justice issued new guidelines on prosecutorial discovery obligations. See 
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Dep’t 
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accurately represent the scope of systemic failure. The standard 
itself is inherently flawed and makes the ordinary, mistaken 
suppression of evidence unreachable.  
State discovery rules have begun to employ broader 
standards that minimize self-serving reasoning by police and 
prosecutors,101 and another proposal for reform would allow 
courts to identify such reasoning more readily by shifting the 
materiality inquiry from impact to potential. The relevance of 
evidence is substantially more accessible to the court’s review 
than the force it might have had. Because the subjectivity of 
fact-finders provides the link between evidence and a guilt 
judgment, any piece of evidence that might be favorable, or could 
impeach the testimony of a government witness, has at least 
potential significance.102  
One analogue can be found in the fraud context, where it has 
long been the government’s position that statements are material 
if they “could have” deceived, without regard to whether they 
actually did.103 Focusing on the capacity that exculpatory 
information has, rather than calculating the likelihood that it 
                                                                                                     
Prosecutors, Regarding Crim. Discovery (Jan. 10, 2010), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/memorandum-department-prosecutors (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2015) (stating that prosecutors should take a broad view of materiality 
and err on the side of disclosing exculpatory and impeachment evidence) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Those measures, of course, still 
leave prosecutors “in charge of deciding what evidence will be material to the 
defense.” Hon. Alex Kozinski, Preface: Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. 
CRIM. PRO. iii, iv–vi (2015); cf. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 
2197, 112th Cong. (2012) (requiring disclosure of all information “that may 
reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution”). 
 101. See, e.g., The Michael Morton Act, S. 1611, 2013 Leg., 83rd Sess. (Tex. 
2013) (adopting an “open file” criminal discovery regime to encourage 
prosecutorial disclosures). 
 102. Similar standards have been advanced in professional responsibility 
codes. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (2012) (requiring the 
disclosure of all evidence that “tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense” without regard to materiality); see also ABA Standing 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/professional_responsibility/
2015/May/Conference/Materials/aba_formal_opnion_09_454.authcheckdam.pdf 
(establishing a similar standard for broader disclosure). 
 103. Cf. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (explaining that a 
statement is material if “a reasonable man would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction 
in question” (internal citation omitted)). 
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would have an impact at trial, makes sense here as well.104 As in 
contexts like fraud and false statements, the potential connection 
between the undisclosed evidence and the question of defendant’s 
guilt could control, instead of what will inevitably be conflicting 
assessments of its likely probative force. What, after all, is the 
harm in mandating disclosure of some evidence that is relevant 
but not necessarily favorable? Even if that approach leads to 
over-disclosure, there is no conceivable detriment to the 
government’s case, and considerable benefit to Brady compliance 
overall. 
Various codes of professional responsibility reflect this 
insight and make all evidence that “tends to negate guilt” 
discoverable.105 Some even explicitly set aside materiality 
considerations.106 Other proposed standards include the 
disclosure of “all evidence or information that [prosecutors] 
reasonably believe will be helpful to the defense or that could 
lead to admissible evidence.”107 No such proposal has gained 
traction in the courts, however. In fact, the relevance concept 
echoes a position from Justice Marshall’s 1985 Bagley opinion 
that has largely languished in dissent since.108  
                                                                                                     
 104. See United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(providing that “intrinsic capabilities” rather than ultimate effect of a false 
statement determine its materiality); cf. United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 
455 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding a false statement material even though it was “so 
ludicrous that no IRS agent would believe [it]”). 
 105. See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations: Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1961, 2030 n.83 (2010) (“[T]he Brady duty runs to the State generally, whereas 
the ethical duty is personal to the prosecutor and is only triggered to the extent 
the prosecutor knows of information that tends to negate guilt or mitigate the 
offense.”). 
 106. See id. at 1998 (noting that a prosecutor may “instruct[] all the 
attorneys in his office to focus on ‘favorability’ questions, while ignoring the 
issue of ‘materiality’”). 
 107. Id. at 1971; see also Green, supra note 64, at 641 (discussing the 2012 
Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act, which would require prosecutors to turn 
over all potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant, without regard to 
materiality). 
 108. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 712 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Even though the prosecution suppressed evidence that was 
specifically requested, apparently the Court of Appeals may now reverse only if 
there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the suppressed evidence ‘would’ have 
altered ‘the result of the [trial].’”). 
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Yet the connection between the Brady obligation and the 
course of trial as a “quest for truth” rather than a “sporting 
event” is newly relevant in light of heightened awareness of 
error.109 Accordingly, rather than use the hindsight that 
materiality requires, courts might consider the relevance of 
undisclosed evidence in light of the factual record, without 
attempting to weigh its actual effect on a trial in which it never 
surfaced. The import of undisclosed evidence might then turn on 
the closeness of its connection to the facts rather than its 
speculative force at trial.  
IV. Considering the Adequacy of Counsel 
The limitations of hindsight standards have similarly 
affected courts’ review of the adequacy of defense counsel under 
the Sixth Amendment. The “skill and knowledge” of defense 
counsel is inextricably linked to whether a trial provides a 
“reliable adversarial testing process.”110 But the Strickland v. 
Washington111 standard by which defense counsel is measured 
requires first that a defendant demonstrate that counsel’s 
performance fall below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and second that the deficient performance “materially” affect the 
outcome of the case.112 Claims of ineffectiveness depend on a 
showing that “counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be 
                                                                                                     
 109. Id. at 693; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: 
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 279 (1963) (“[S]hall 
we continue to regard the criminal trial as ‘in the nature of a game or sporting 
contest’ and not ‘a serious inquiry aiming to distinguish between guilt and 
innocence’?”); Colin P. Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent 
in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 158–59 
(2012) (analyzing conflicts in substantive and procedural due process in relation 
to the Brady framework); New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure 
Obligations, supra note 105, at 1964 (“[P]rosecutorial disclosure is necessary to 
promote the public interest in achieving fair trials and reliable outcomes in the 
criminal justice system.”). 
 110. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984); see also United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (stating that the presence of defense 
counsel tests the government’s case and thereby produces more accurate 
results). 
 111. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 112. Id. at 687. 
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relied on as having produced a just result.”113 Thus, even once a 
defendant has met the weighty burden of demonstrating 
inadequate performance, she must go on to establish that those 
errors “actually had an adverse effect on the defense.”114 This is 
the functional equivalent of showing that exculpatory information 
was withheld in violation of Brady, and in addition that the 
exculpatory evidence in question would have materially affected 
the outcome of trial. In other words, given a record that reveals a 
demonstrably inferior advocate, courts must still decide whether 
a superior one would have produced a different result. 
A. The Structure of Strickland 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are simultaneously 
the most commonly brought115—occurring far more frequently 
than Brady contentions—and among the most difficult to prove. 
The Strickland Court took note of the potential hindsight 
problem, but only with regard to the evaluation of attorney 
performance, and only in the direction of affirmance.116 The Court 
discussed what social scientists would call “outcome bias,” which 
in this context is the belief that an attorney should have known 
how a particular strategy would play out because it appears so 
clearly ill-advised after the fact.117 Referring to the “distorting 
effects of hindsight,” the Court concluded that a “fair assessment 
of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
eliminate [it].”118 As a result, there is a “strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 113. Id. at 686. 
 114. Id. at 693. 
 115. See Nancy J. King, Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 
YALE L.J. 2428, 2439 (2013) (discussing filing rates for independent assistance of 
counsel claims). 
 116. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 117. See id. (“[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge 
the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular 
case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”). 
 118. Id.; see also Guthrie et al., supra note 8, at 800 (stating that the 
“hindsight bias likely influences findings of ineffective assistance of counsel” in 
the sense that “decisions a lawyer makes in the course of representing a 
criminal defendant can seem less competent after the defendant has been 
convicted”). 
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professional assistance.”119 Under that standard, however, post 
hoc rationalizations for poor attorney decisions are at least as 
likely as hindsight bias arising from outcome knowledge. Even 
where counsel’s errors probably cost a defendant an acquittal, a 
reviewing court can conclude that the “overall representation 
[was] not bad enough to rebut the presumption of 
reasonableness.”120 
The Strickland Court made no mention of the hindsight 
blindness that renders the prejudice prong an even more 
substantial hurdle. Cognitive constraints, however, preclude a 
clear view of the trial, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
determine whether a better lawyer would have achieved a 
favorable verdict. The most significant confirmatory bias is the 
one that makes conviction seem inevitable despite the quality of 
the lawyering.121 Strickland’s prejudice prong requires the court 
to determine whether incompetent counsel mattered, but 
hindsight blindness hampers its ability to do so and almost 
always leads to affirmance.122  
This is a notable oversight when the Court has otherwise 
displayed its awareness of the interwoven effects of attorney 
performance. For instance, when deciding that the denial of a 
paid attorney of the defendant’s choice required reversal, the 
Court wrote that different counsel 
will pursue different strategies with regard to investigation 
and discovery, development of the theory of the defense, 
selection of the jury, presentation of the witnesses, . . . style of 
witness examination and jury argument . . . [and] whether and 
                                                                                                     
 119. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also id. at 688–89 (“No particular set of 
detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety 
of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions 
regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.”). 
 120. George C. Thomas, III, History’s Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 
U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 553. 
 121. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(“Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense 
counsel.”). 
 122. See id. (“[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted 
after a trial in which he was ineffectively represented would have fared better if 
his lawyer had been competent.”). 
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on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, 
plea bargains, or decides instead to go to trial.123  
Counsel’s inadequacy is similarly integrated with the entire 
course of trial. Indeed, lawyers themselves “often have difficulty 
explaining precisely why a certain witness was called to testify 
and another was not, or why one line of defense was pursued and 
another was avoided.”124  
It was not until the Court’s recent decisions extending the 
Strickland standard to the plea bargaining context,125 however, 
that the Court even acknowledged that hindsight pervades the 
prejudice prong as well. And there, objecting to the Court’s 
decision in favor of the defendant, Justice Scalia stated that 
prejudice would be determined “by a process of retrospective 
crystal-ball gazing posing as legal analysis.”126 Hindsight 
generally works against defendants, however. Reviewing courts 
rarely articulate counterfactuals that lead to acquittal. That they 
reach different results on similar fact patterns illuminates the 
subjective nature of the inquiry. Moreover, as with Brady 
violations, courts apply the burden to show outcome effects 
inconsistently.127  
A very narrow set of deficiencies does fall into the category of 
presumed prejudice.128 Some deprivations are so fundamentally 
unfair that the court need not even inquire about their impact, 
including the absence of counsel, the refusal of counsel to 
participate in the proceedings, and a conflict of interest that 
precludes counsel from acting as an advocate.129 In these 
                                                                                                     
 123. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006). 
 124. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REV 988, 
990 (1973). 
  125. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 126. Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(requiring the defendant to show a “substantial” and not just a “conceivable” 
likelihood of a different result). 
 128. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (finding that 
“complete denial” of the assistance of counsel constitutes per se prejudice), 
abrogated on other grounds by Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 26 
(2000). 
 129. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980) (“A guilty plea is open 
to attack on the ground that counsel did not provide the defendant with 
‘reasonably competent advice.’ Furthermore, court procedures that restrict a 
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categories, the defendant is not required to make a showing of 
actual prejudice.130 The complete or constructive denial of counsel 
will thus lead to reversal regardless of the reliability of the 
underlying verdict. But because of the actual prejudice standard 
that otherwise applies, claims about a defense lawyer who was 
present, but might as well have stayed home, will rarely 
succeed.131  
Take defense counsel in Muniz v. Smith,132 who fell asleep 
during the cross-examination of the defendant.133 That 
examination reached a critical point when the defendant made 
ill-advised statements that ultimately led to the admission of a 
previously suppressed 911 call by his mother and laid the 
groundwork for a state rebuttal witness as well.134 Presumably, 
had counsel been both wide awake and constitutionally adequate, 
the line of questioning concerning the credibility of other 
witnesses would have drawn an objection. The hindsight-based 
Strickland inquiry, however, did not provide relief because the 
significance of timely objections, or even an artful 
cross-examination, is simply unknowable.135 The Sixth Circuit 
held here, for example, that there was no showing of prejudice 
                                                                                                     
lawyer’s tactical decision to put the defendant on the stand unconstitutionally 
abridge the right to counsel.” (citations omitted)). 
 130. Id.  
 131. See Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that a 
habitually intoxicated lawyer—notorious for drinking during the time period of 
the trial but not actually in court—was not constitutionally ineffective because 
the petitioner could not show specific instances of deficient performance due to 
alcohol consumption); Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 515, 542–43 (2009) (concluding that the Strickland standard 
shields “a wide array of stunningly incompetent and unprofessional 
representation”). But cf. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 (1995) (“[T]he 
Constitution cannot tolerate trials in which counsel, though present in name, is 
unable to assist the defendant to obtain a fair decision on the merits.”); Hill v. 
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (stating that counsel’s error in failing “to 
investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence” could prejudice 
defendant by precipitating a guilty plea). 
 132. 647 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 133. Id. at 622. 
 134. Id. at 624–25. 
 135. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1994) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible . . . to ascertain 
[if the prosecution’s case] would have stood up against rebuttal and 
cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.”). 
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under Strickland, and that presumed prejudice only arises when 
a lawyer sleeps through a “substantial portion of defendant’s 
trial.”136 A brief nap during a short cross-examination did not 
raise a “reasonable probability of a different outcome.”137  
B. Obstacles to Enforcement 
Even in recent cases where the Court has expanded the 
possibility of constitutionally inadequate assistance—including 
the failure to advise defendants entering guilty pleas of the 
collateral consequences of deportation,138 exceedingly poor advice 
about rejecting a plea offer,139 or the failure to even convey a plea 
offer140—the prejudice prong remains an obstacle to 
enforcement.141 The 2012 Lafler142 and Frye143 decisions require 
assessment of the adequacy of counsel during plea bargaining, 
and this new set of considerations could make inroads into the 
problems with the standard itself. There are, however, more 
objective metrics of the effect of bad advice during plea 
bargaining than with regard to poor lawyering at trial. This is so 
because a defendant convicted at trial will typically receive a 
higher sentence than was offered in a plea agreement.144 In the 
Frye case, for example, there was a “reasonable probability” that 
the defendant would have accepted the lesser plea because he 
ultimately pleaded guilty to a more serious charge with no 
                                                                                                     
 136. Muniz, 647 F.3d at 623. 
 137. Id. at 625. 
 138. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 388 (2010). 
 139. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012). 
 140. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 
 141. See id. (“To show prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel where 
a plea offer has lapsed or been rejected because of counsel’s deficient 
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have accepted the earlier plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance 
of counsel.”); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (discussing the injuries experienced by 
defendants who “decline a plea offer as a result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel”). 
 142. Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1376. 
 143. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399. 
 144. See Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54 HOW. L.J. 693, 
732–38 (2011) (discussing the meaning of prejudice in the context of plea 
bargaining). 
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promise of a sentencing recommendation from the prosecutor.145 
In the Lafler case, the defendant was made aware of the plea 
offer but got patently bad counsel about whether to accept it, 
including an incorrect explanation of the burden of proof for 
intent to murder.146 The defendant then received a harsher 
sentence after trial than the one offered in the plea.147 
There is little record of what occurs during plea bargaining, 
however, and it will not always be sufficiently apparent what the 
defendant would have done, especially before being confronted 
with the strength of the prosecution’s case. Many defendants 
resist rational choices to accept pleas until trial begins, at which 
point their peril is more apparent, and they will even “plead 
blind” without any agreement in the hope of some mitigation 
from the court. Nonetheless, Lafler and Frye require that 
defendants show not only that the plea offer would have been 
attractive but also that it would have been adhered to by the 
prosecution and accepted by the trial court.148 Historical practice 
might inform the assessment of whether prosecutors would have 
honored bargains and courts would have accepted them. Though 
still hindsight review, that is less speculative than determining 
whether a strategic error affected a particular jury’s deliberations 
and decision.  
Still, how to restore both the prosecution and the defense to 
the positions they would have occupied absent the constitutional 
violation remains a difficult remedial question. As Justice Scalia 
objected in Frye, it is conceivable that the application of hindsight 
standards to ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to plea 
bargaining will benefit some defendants who were not disposed to 
                                                                                                     
 145. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404–05. 
 146. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (describing counsel’s advice that “the 
prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder [the victim] 
because she had been shot below the waist”). 
 147. Id. at 1383. 
 148. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (concluding that the defendant likely would 
have accepted the plea offer if it had been communicated to him, but that he 
failed to overcome the Court’s “strong reason to doubt [whether] the prosecution 
and the trial court would have permitted the plea bargain to become final”); see 
also Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (determining that the defendant satisfied the 
deficient performance prong of Strickland by showing that he likely would have 
accepted the plea offer if he had not been ill-advised). 
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plead guilty.149 It will only be the rare case in which a plea offer 
sits idle for a month, or a lawyer clearly neglects to explain the 
strength of the prosecution’s case, but almost every defendant 
convicted at trial can claim that she would have accepted a plea 
agreement. As a result, requiring effective assistance of counsel 
at the plea bargaining stage seems momentous but may not 
break substantial new ground in terms of the scope of the right to 
counsel and the overall quality of representation.150  
What the reasoning in Lafler and Frye could achieve, 
however, is enlarged thinking about what it means to have an 
impact on the outcome of a criminal proceeding. Extending 
Strickland to plea agreements requires some new consideration of 
the difficulty with identifying the effect of errors and omissions. 
And that in turn suggests revised approaches to hindsight 
constraints in other contexts. To include the result of plea 
bargaining in the range of prejudicial errors at least hints at a 
broader and more holistic view of criminal adjudication as a 
process with a spectrum of possible conclusions. The injustice of a 
wrongful conviction sits at one end, and perhaps the highly 
speculative windfall of a wrongful acquittal on the other. But in 
between may be unfair procedures despite accurate results, a 
split verdict that the jury might reach, and sentences and 
collateral consequences that vary in severity for the defendant. If 
defendants should not experience shifts along that spectrum 
without adequate counsel within the meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment—and Lafler and Frye suggest that they should not—
then “correct” outcomes do not excuse many other instances of 
deficient lawyering that currently elide review.  
Even an error-free trial or a subsequent voluntary plea that 
follows the ill-considered decision to reject a plea cannot cure 
inadequate defense lawyering.151 And if that is the case, it 
expands the potential claims about prejudice. Perhaps at other 
points in the trial as well—including when the court admits 
                                                                                                     
 149. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 150. See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. 
ONLINE 39 (2012) (“Finally, we know that the heavens will not fall as a result of 
Frye and Lafler, because the cases’ rule is ‘new’ only to the Supreme Court.”). 
 151. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (rejecting the argument that “[a] fair trial 
wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea 
bargaining”). 
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evidence, when a jury is empaneled, and when a sentence is 
imposed—courts will begin to connect ineffective assistance of 
counsel to materially worse positions for defendants. 
Recognizing that the inadequacy of counsel amplifies other 
errors and disadvantages for defendants also begins a 
conversation about whether hindsight standards have masked 
systemic problems and prevented reforms.152 The fiftieth 
anniversary of the Gideon153 decision extending the right to 
counsel to indigent defendants has occasioned a broader 
discussion of the crisis in public defense.154 While there are some 
prosecutors who leverage the Brady standard to avoid discovery 
obligations, defense lawyers do not set out to be ineffective. Yet a 
distressingly large number of defendants do not receive 
constitutionally adequate counsel. Indeed, one study concluded 
that, at least in relatively uncomplicated cases, pro se defendants 
may achieve better results than counseled ones.155 The 
hindsight-based prejudice standard is one of the obstacles to 
thinking beyond individual case outcomes to broader system 
failure. 
Absent consequences for ineffective lawyering, there is little 
incentive for the criminal justice system to allocate increased 
resources and address that shortfall. As Donald Dripps writes, 
“Legislatures disinclined to fund indigent defense know that the 
failure to provide effective representation will lead to the reversal 
of few if any convictions.”156 A more expansive standard, less 
encumbered by hindsight analysis, could do more to underscore 
                                                                                                     
 152. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 
2687–91 (2013) (attributing the failures of the system of public defense in part 
to the Strickland standard). 
 153. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 154. See KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR 
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the way in which caseloads and resource constraints prevent 
effective advocacy.157  
A wholesale response to the familiar “broken system” story at 
first sounds purely aspirational. But it could gain some 
momentum from the empirical evidence that ineffective 
assistance of counsel contributes to retail inaccuracy. Brandon 
Garrett reports that ineffective assistance of counsel claims were 
raised in 32% of the cases in his database of DNA exonerations.158 
Among those wrongful convictions were fifty-two adjudicated 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, only four of which 
produced a reversal of the conviction, and all of which involved a 
lawyer whose representation was so egregiously below the 
constitutional standard that he was subsequently disbarred.159  
If one understands the right to counsel as deontological 
rather than consequential, any trial in which defense counsel 
fails to meet certain performance benchmarks may be 
insufficiently “fair” regardless of the correctness of the outcome. 
Even under the deferential standards of post-conviction review, 
counsel sleeping during the defendant’s cross-examination or 
failing to test forensic evidence warrants reversal.160 There is a 
baseline below which counsel’s performance should never dip, 
particularly in death penalty cases. Yet Strickland’s hindsight 
                                                                                                     
 157. Cf. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal 
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HINDSIGHT BLIND SPOTS 197 
component allows post-conviction reviewing courts to ignore cases 
in which defense counsel was barely more than present.161 
Though a requirement of reasonably competent counsel in every 
case is a long way off, it would be closer if hindsight figured less 
in the equation, and defendants did not bear the burden of 
showing that the trial would actually have proceeded differently 
with a superior advocate. 
V. Determining the Significance of Error 
Both the Brady and the Strickland standards resemble the 
broader category of harmless error analysis, which similarly ties 
reversal to a hindsight evaluation. As with the “materiality” and 
“prejudice” inquiries, reviewing courts weigh the “harmfulness” of 
trial errors by looking back at a trial that never took place. For 
example, courts excise erroneously admitted evidence and then 
determine whether the evidence that remains appears adequate. 
A. Quantitative Assessments of Impact 
With regard to most trial errors, including the erroneous 
introduction and exclusion of evidence, reversal occurs only 
where a “substantial right of the party is affected.”162 If a court 
“concludes with fair assurance” that the judgment “was not 
substantially swayed by the error,” then the defendant’s 
conviction will stand.163 A higher standard applies to 
                                                                                                     
 161. See Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786–87 
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constitutional errors, which the court must find harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.164 In theory, the Chapman standard for 
reviewing constitutional errors places a considerable burden on 
the government to demonstrate that the error did not “contribute 
to the verdict,” but in practice the same hindsight disability 
obstructs review.165 And errors are still further insulated from 
analysis by the procedural requirements of federal habeas claims. 
Under Brecht v. Abrahamson,166 an error must have a 
“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 
jury’s verdict.”167  
Only structural errors—which include the complete absence 
of counsel, denial of the right to self-representation or to paid 
counsel of one’s choice, a biased judge, a defective reasonable 
doubt instruction, denial of a public trial, and racial 
discrimination in the selection of the grand jury—lead to 
automatic reversal.168 Although the Court recognizes structural 
errors as “[d]efects in the constitution of the trial mechanism 
itself,”169 the category is narrow, and even a conviction tainted by 
a coerced confession can be upheld if the Chapman test is met.170 
This is so because the Supreme Court has reasoned that 
constitutional errors that occur during the presentation of the 
case may “be quantitatively assessed in the context of other 
                                                                                                     
 164. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 25–26 (1967). 
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 166. 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
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 170. Id. at 282. 
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evidence presented in order to determine whether . . . admission 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”171 Thus, harmless 
error analysis ends up functioning in a similar fashion when 
applied to both evidentiary and constitutional errors.172 
B. Photoshopped Trials 
The structure of the analysis weighs in favor of affirming 
convictions, but to differing extents depending on which of two 
inconsistent approaches a particular court applies.173 In the 
jurisprudence of harmless error, courts have proceeded through 
either an “evidence-focused” or an “outcome-focused” inquiry.174 
In the former, an error is harmful if it contributed to the verdict, 
and the persuasive force of other evidence does not control.175 In 
the latter approach, so long as there was sufficient evidence that 
was properly admitted to sustain the verdict, any error is deemed 
harmless.176  
Although the “evidence-focused” inquiry appears more 
consistent with review of the actual trial, in practice, wherever 
courts perceive overwhelming evidence, they tend to view the 
error as insignificant and thus affirm.177 What courts say they are 
doing when considering an error and the analysis that they 
perform often diverge. That is, despite the content of the 
Chapman standard for reviewing constitutional errors, the Brecht 
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 172. See, e.g., Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577–78 (1986) (“[T]he Court in 
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standard on federal habeas, and related iterations,178 courts 
generally do not focus on the prejudicial “contributions” the error 
might have made but only on the general question whether “the 
record developed at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”179 As a result, in upwards of two-thirds of all habeas cases 
in which a court identifies trial error, that error is deemed 
harmless.180  
The reason the precise words of the standards do not matter 
very much is that no formulation can enable courts to see the 
outcome of an error-free trial that did not occur.181 It is hard to 
identify meaningful distinctions between what are functionally 
just iterations of the same test.182 And that test proceeds from the 
false premise that errors can be excised or airbrushed to enable 
review.  
Applied narrative theory foretells the failure of these 
standards because it suggests that quantitative assertions are 
impossible to make. If a defense lawyer consistently fails to join 
issue with the government in an adversarial process, or a jury 
hears a defendant’s coerced but compelling confession, how does 
one measure that impact? Given the “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard that the government must meet, even very small errors 
have the potential to alter the outcome. Trials may involve 
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multiple missteps with cumulative impact. Death penalty cases, 
for example, have two distinct phases that require review, and 
the longer and more serious trials that death penalty cases 
involve are both more complex to assess and concern more serious 
and horrible crimes that already inspire confirmation bias. 
Nonetheless, when courts review error, it is as though they have 
“photoshopped” the trial and considered whether the new image 
supports a conviction.183 
To mitigate hindsight bias requires articulating the standard 
in more holistic terms and considering new mechanisms for its 
application. And that may call for a more qualitative than 
quantitative approach. As Justice Stevens wrote in his United 
States v. Hasting184 concurrence, the question is “what effect the 
error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury’s 
decision” and “[t]he crucial thing is the impact of the thing done 
wrong on the minds of other men, not on one’s own, in the total 
setting.”185 Indeed, there may be constitutional implications to 
the construction of the harmless error standard. The defendant 
has a right to present evidence to the jury empaneled to hear her 
case; invoking the “sympathy and opinion” of those jurors is an 
opportunity guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.186  
The standard originally did task courts with “pondering all 
that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the 
whole,”187 but the most recent cases not only shift the burden but 
also change the question. In practice, when appeals courts look at 
the issue of evidence strength instead of error impact, they sit as 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1354 (“[A]n assumption that appellate 
judges can conduct a fair second trial on the basis of ‘untainted evidence’ is 
problematic in that it assumes that fine distinctions can be drawn between 
tainted and untainted evidence when all of this evidence remains in the record 
as a coherent whole.”). Indeed, the difficulty of excising evidence admitted in 
error has raised the question whether testimony could all be videotaped before a 
jury is empaneled. Once all errors and irrelevancies are removed according to a 
trial judge’s rulings, the jury would then watch it. See generally Ronald 
Goldstock & James B. Jacobs, A Blockbuster Trial, 33 CRIM. L. BULL. 565 (1998). 
 184. 461 U.S. 499 (1983).  
 185. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 
328 U.S. 750, 763–64 (1946)). 
 186. See Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1355 (“Indeed, the defendant may seek 
to exploit the sympathies of jurors who have not become immune to the pleas of 
defendants or jaded by repeated encounters with hardened criminals.”). 
 187. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). 
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fact-finders in the first instance. The result is that defendants 
receive a verdict not from “peers” but from “experienced jurists” 
who may have “become immune to the pleas of defendants.”188 
Regardless of the type of error under review, the determination 
as to harm depends primarily on a “judgment about the factual 
guilt of the defendant.”189 And the trend has been to continue 
raising the bar for reversal by “reducing the number of errors 
that are reversible per se” and “reducing the burden of proof on 
the prosecution of convincing the appellate court that an error 
was harmless.”190  
The Supreme Court was recently poised to consider this 
conflict between determining guilt and weighing error in Vasquez 
v. United States.191 Vasquez involved a conviction for conspiracy 
to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute it.192 The 
government presented evidence of recorded telephone calls in 
which a witness told her husband that he and Vasquez were 
likely to be convicted, and that the defendant’s lawyer had said so 
as well.193 The Seventh Circuit held, in light of the other evidence 
in the case, that the error did not change the outcome of the 
proceeding.194 Arguing to the Supreme Court, the defendant 
claimed that a reviewing court should determine how an error 
affected the jury that actually evaluated the trial.195 The 
                                                                                                     
 188. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1355. In House v. Bell, for example, Chief 
Justice Roberts explained that, even with regard to an actual innocence claim, 
the question is “not whether [the defendant] was prejudiced at his trial because 
the jurors were not aware of the new evidence” but whether “all the evidence, 
considered together, proves that [the defendant] was actually innocent, so that 
no reasonable juror would vote to convict him.” 547 U.S. 518, 556 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 189. Edwards, supra note 10, at 1171; see also ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE 
OF HARMLESS ERROR 35 (1970) (“A less stringent test may fail to deter an 
appellate judge from focusing his inquiry on the correctness of the result and 
then holding an error harmless whenever he equated the result with his own 
predilections.”). 
 190. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 3 J. LEG. 
STUD. 161, 172 (2001). 
 191. 132 S. Ct. 1532 (2012). 
 192. United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 193. Id. at 896. 
 194. Id. at 898. 
 195. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Vasquez v. United States, 132 S. 
Ct. 1532 (2012) (No. 11-199) (statement of Beau B. Brindley) (“It is 
impermissible for the reviewing court to merely ask the question of whether 
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government countered that the Court could assume instead that 
a hypothetical, reasonable jury heard the evidence.196 The 
Justices repeatedly stated at argument, however, that they did 
not see the distinction between the two standards.197 The case 
turned out to be a poor vehicle because it was not clear which 
standard the Seventh Circuit itself applied, or whether the 
standard applied would have made much difference. As a result, 
the Court ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari as 
“improvidently granted.”198 It serves as an illustration, however, 
of the way in which hindsight standards continue to ease the 
government’s burden of proof. 199  
Courts both discount the effect of the challenged error and 
weigh the evidence as a whole, and they then fail to engage in the 
required counterfactual reasoning. Especially once judges are 
themselves exposed to erroneously admitted evidence, it is 
profoundly difficult to assess what a hypothetical juror without 
that evidence would have concluded.200 If evidence is 
                                                                                                     
some other jury, a reasonable jury that didn’t hear the error that this jury 
heard, would convict him and determine harmlessness on that basis.”). 
 196. See id. at 28 (statement of Anthony A. Yang) (“The harmless-error 
inquiry, as this Court explained in Neder and prior decisions, turns ultimately 
on one question: Whether a rational jury—and this is a quote—‘whether a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.’”). 
 197. See id. at 8 (statement of Justice Alito) (stating that “I really don’t 
understand the difference between” focusing on a “rational jury” and focusing on 
“this particular jury”); id. at 9 (statement of Justice Alito) (inquiring about the 
difference between “a fair possibility that this particular evidence caused the 
jury to convict” and a “fair possibility that this jury would have convicted 
without the evidence”); id. at 16 (statement of Justice Breyer) (“I didn’t see some 
big war of standards. I just saw judges disagreeing about a fairly tough question 
in an individual case.”); id. at 27 (statement of Justice Alito) (“How is an 
appellate court supposed to tell whether this particular jury was different from 
a hypothetical rational jury?”). 
 198. Vasquez, 132 S. Ct. at 1532. 
 199. See Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 992 (“If the ‘moral force’ of the 
criminal law is not to be diluted on appeal, convictions must be reversed where 
the appellate court cannot arrive at a conclusion about the impact of an error on 
the jury verdict with the same degree of certainty demanded at the trial.”); see 
also TRAYNOR, supra note 189, at 61 (“[T]he prosecution cannot on the one hand 
offer evidence to prove guilt . . . and on the other for the purposes of avoiding the 
consequences of the error, caused by its wrongful admission, be heard to assert 
that the matter offered as a confession was not prejudicial because it did not 
tend to prove guilt.”). 
 200. See Wallace & Kassin, supra note 180, at 152 (concluding from an 
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interdependent, moreover, then demonstrating that any given 
piece did not “contribute” to the outcome ought to be a heavy 
burden.201 There are no “scripts for conviction,” and no clear way 
to determine whether an error meaningfully changed the 
narrative. Or at least one can rarely say “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” that an error did not make any contribution. As with 
Brady and Strickland violations, courts have overestimated the 
precision with which they can weigh the significance of an error 
or omission within the complete picture of the trial.202 Indeed, 
they cannot actually do what harmless error review demands,203 
and a standard less encumbered by hindsight could produce both 
clearer and more accurate decisions. 
VI. Limiting the Role of Hindsight 
Just as these three different contexts reveal common 
conceptual flaws, they might be reimagined in similar ways. 
Translating theoretical and empirical insights into adjustments 
to legal rules is a notoriously glacial process.204 To attempt it at 
                                                                                                     
experimental analysis that judges exposed to prejudicial evidence admitted in 
error would view guilt as more likely than judges unaware of the evidence); see 
generally Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and 
Mental Correction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117 (1984). 
 201. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–23 (1967) (“The question is 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction.”). 
 202. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence 
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 190 (2006) (“[P]rofessionals typically overestimate 
the power of their own professional skills, the reliability of their own judgments, 
and the strength of their ability to assess a particular situation.”); Suzanna 
Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 799 (2003) (reviewing 
the literature on the fallibility of judges); see also Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in 
Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. R. 65, 1–3 (1983) (reporting that even 
graduate students in probability theory believe a conjunction is more likely than 
either of its constituent parts). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 
136 (1968) (“We, of course, acknowledge the impossibility of determining 
whether in fact the jury did or did not ignore [the] statement inculpating 
petitioner in determining petitioner’s guilt.”). 
 203. See Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 
501, 516 (1998) (“[A] judge cannot possibly know or review what in the minds of 
the jurors led to the verdict.”). 
 204. See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, The Content of Confrontation, 7 DUKE J. 
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all raises the question whether judges can account for social 
science in their own decision-making. Only recently, for example, 
has awareness about eyewitness error and false confessions made 
any incursion into the adjudicative realm.205 But courts have 
begun to perceive the shortcomings of hindsight standards, and 
they might conduct a more searching review of the role of the 
error or omission at the actual trial, expand the violations that 
give rise to a presumption of prejudice, or remove materiality 
assessments from the calculus altogether.    
A. Verdicts Untainted by Error 
Any effort to invigorate review will encounter not only the 
cognitive biases that confirm convictions but also conscious policy 
choices to avoid the inefficiency of retrials. The harmless error 
rule, for example, has long been understood as a protection for 
both the sustainability and the legitimacy of criminal 
adjudication.206 Significant adjustments to harmless error rules 
would raise administrability concerns,207 and there is “no reason 
                                                                                                     
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2011) (discussing the durability of myths about 
cross-examination and the courts’ disinclination to “incorporate empirical data 
and the insights of social science”); Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus 
Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155 (“What is 
remarkable, however, is the ever-widening gap between Fourth Amendment 
consent jurisprudence, on the one hand, and scientific findings about the 
psychology of compliance and consent on the other.”). 
 205. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, A Plan to Combat Mistaken Identifications and 
False Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2015, at A21 (“[A] rare coalition of the 
New York State Bar Association, the District Attorneys Association of New York 
and the Innocence Project proposed on Tuesday that the state adopt practices to 
reduce the chances that juries would be swayed by mistaken eyewitnesses or 
false confessions.”). 
 206. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (acknowledging 
that the goal of harmless error review is “to conserve judicial resources by 
enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial error 
without becoming mired in harmless error”); see generally, e.g., Note, The 
Harmless Error Rule Reviewed, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (1947). 
 207. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1994) (noting 
that the systematic costs of overturning jury verdicts are high); Roger A. 
Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth-Century 
Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 447 (2009) 
(describing the harmless error rule as arising from concerns about efficiency and 
the finality of convictions).  
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to believe that appellate courts are much interested in increasing 
the number of correct-outcome cases that they will scrutinize 
closely.”208  
Efficiency ought to be only a secondary consideration,209 but 
it is an imperative that requires some safety valve. One seems 
built-in however. The question is not whether a verdict was 
untouched by error but whether it stands untainted by it. Even 
the strictest of harmless error tests “would not require reversal 
for insignificant errors” or lead to “hypertechnicality.”210 There 
are trials in which it is apparent that no further disclosure, 
improved advocacy, or more precise application of the 
exclusionary rules could possibly change the outcome. For 
example, a witness with respect to whom impeachment material 
was withheld might be one of many possible sponsors for a 
business record, or an attorney might neglect the testing of 
flawed forensics that duplicate several other pieces of evidence.211 
Mitigating hindsight does not entail reversing for every trivial 
error. 
The current process also insulates non-trivial errors from 
review, however, and reversal should occur unless the 
government can demonstrate that errors and violations were 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.212 That showing requires 
not that the evidence of guilt was sufficiently overwhelming to 
                                                                                                     
 208. Schauer, supra note 202, at 200. 
 209. See Brown, supra note 50, at 142 (“American courts, which have played 
the lead role in making criminal process more efficient, could improve American 
political decision-making by developing the law and practice of adjudication 
with less priority for its efficiency and more for its traditional, qualitative public 
interests.”); Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1366 (“One goal of the harmless error 
doctrine is the preservation of public respect for the judicial system by not 
reversing for nonprejudicial errors[, but] public respect may also be undermined 
when significant errors go uncorrected, and when constitutional rights thus go 
unprotected.”); see also TRAYNOR, supra note 189, at 19 (“The conservation of 
judicial resources, though itself a worthy objective, is a strange terminal point 
for an argument purportedly concerned with precluding miscarriages of 
justice.”). 
 210. Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1367. 
 211. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (“Attorney errors come in an infinite 
variety and are as likely to be utterly harmless.”). 
 212. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 474 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(stating that the reviewing court must be “convinced that the jury would have 
convicted even absent the error”). 
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ignore the error altogether, but that in context, it is apparent 
that the jury reached a verdict untainted by the error.213 
Adjustments to the standard that excise materiality are unlikely, 
but much would change if courts applied the existing standard to 
the trial that occurred rather than “reviewing” an error-free trial 
that never took place and looking to the end of a road not taken.  
That road simply cannot be seen clearly. Errors can 
contribute to verdicts by changing the shape of other pieces of 
evidence or the mind of one juror. To take just one example from 
“coherence based reasoning,” as Dan Kahan explains, “evidence 
judged to have been of only modest weight early on will 
subsequently be re-evaluated and assigned a greater degree of 
weight consistent with the outcome most supported by the 
remaining evidence.”214 The question is whether it is reasonable 
to conclude that an error had any effect on the course a trial took, 
not whether it is reasonable to conclude that a conviction would 
have occurred regardless. Another way to think about this 
involves an attempt to evaluate how the error or omission in 
question affected the presentation and processing of evidence. If 
the working hypothesis is that an error was harmless, then the 
best way to establish that is by attempting to disprove it through 
consideration of scenarios under which the error would have been 
harmful.215  
To account for the seriousness of an error and its likely role 
in the narrative course of trial, courts could also focus on the 
extent to which the evidence does intertwine. It is entirely 
possible for a case to have more than sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction but for an error nonetheless to contribute to 
the verdict. Those two facts can coexist because, even though the 
other evidence is weighty, it is not entirely independent from the 
error.216 An adjusted analysis could account for factors such as 
                                                                                                     
 213. Id. 
 214. Dan M. Kahan, Laws of Cognition and the Cognition of Law, 135 
COGNITION 56 (2015). 
 215. See FINDLEY & O’BRIEN, supra note 69, at 37 (explaining that, “without 
testing for outcomes that would disprove a hypothesis, people may never 
consider that their hypotheses were wrong and that they had merely proposed 
conditions that coincidentally fit the actual rule or principle at work” but that, 
“[a]s any scientist knows, the inability to disprove a hypothesis is the closest one 
can come to proving the hypothesis to be true”). 
 216. See Griffin, supra note 17, at 295 (discussing the way in which pieces of 
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whether evidence admitted or excluded in error is largely 
collateral or interacts with central elements of proof, whether 
witnesses with regard to whom impeachment material was 
withheld provided key testimony for the government, or whether 
counsel’s deficient performance forfeited an opportunity to rebut 
damaging evidence.  
On the other hand, when an error only compounds 
substantial disadvantages for the defense, it may be held 
harmless. The error may not be fully independent from the rest of 
the trial, but its effect will have been minimal. Considering the 
nature of an error does account for the weight of other evidence 
as well. But that is not to say that a strong government case 
excuses an otherwise egregious error, just that whether a case is 
closely balanced should factor into the assessment of the error 
itself. For example, one signal that the jury viewed a case as close 
could be a split verdict. Moreover, the record can reveal how 
much emphasis prosecutors placed on the error in questioning 
and argument, how much they profited from it or leveraged the 
opportunity,217 the connection between the error and the defense 
theory of the case, and in some cases whether the jury asked 
questions that an evidentiary error might have affected, engaged 
in lengthy deliberations, or even reacted to erroneously admitted 
evidence with emotion or confusion.218  
The dissenting judge in Vasquez, for instance, characterized 
the gravity of the error itself, which discredited “the defendant’s 
own lawyer’s argument about reasonable doubt.”219 The dissent 
then concluded that the error was harmful given the split verdict, 
the government’s use of the evidence, and “the modest strength of 
                                                                                                     
evidence interact with and influence each other). 
 217. See United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(finding harmful error because the prosecutor made an assertion in closing 
argument that the prosecutor “knew was contradicted by evidence not presented 
to the jury”). 
 218. Similarly, jury questions have been held by some courts to signal the 
potential import of undisclosed evidence. See United States v. Garner, 507 F.3d 
399, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that a reasonable probability existed that 
the outcome of the trial might have been different had defense counsel 
investigated cell phone records based in part on “the fact that the jury sent out a 
question during deliberations” asking about a cell phone number). 
 219. United States v. Vasquez, 635 F.3d 889, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (Hamilton, 
J., dissenting). 
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the rest of the [G]overnment’s case.”220 When it comes to 
analyzing an erroneous exclusion—such as discovery that a 
defendant did not receive, or an opportunity that a defense 
lawyer missed—the reviewing court (typically a habeas court) 
could consider what the fact-finder might have gained had the 
avenue not been cut off.221  
This analytical approach is not unprecedented. Where a 
Confrontation Clause violation denies a defendant the 
opportunity to impeach a government witness for bias, the 
Supreme Court has at times engaged in a contextual 
consideration of the “damaging potential of cross-examination.”222 
The Court has then weighed that potential gain against the 
importance of the prosecution witness’s testimony, accounting for 
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence 
of corroborating or contradictory evidence on material points, and 
the overall strength of the case.223 Without question, such an 
inquiry still involves speculation, but it at least considers not 
only “what might have been” but also “what was.” The current 
standard arguably requires that approach already, and the 
missteps have been in application.224  
An analogous theoretical move attempts to align 
decision-making with the purposes of standards of proof like 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”225 When assessing whether 
discovery was material, counsel’s performance prejudicial, or an 
error harmful, judges might also benefit from what Michael 
                                                                                                     
 220. Id.  
 221. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 124, at 990 (noting that, because of a 
particular error, “[a] meritorious line of defense may be dropped, an important 
witness held back, or entire strategies abandoned even though they should 
prevail”). 
 222. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). 
 223. Id. 
 224. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) (calling the panel’s ruling “dangerously broad” with “far-reaching 
implications for the administration of justice” because it “effectively announces 
that the prosecution need not produce exculpatory evidence so long as it’s 
possible the defendant would’ve been convicted anyway”). 
 225. Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1099 
(2009) (discussing application of the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
and stating that “courts lack a vocabulary through which to make their 
reasoning explicit and to justify their doubts and convictions about what a 
reasonable jury could or must conclude based on the evidence”). 
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Pardo has called “second-order proof rules.”226 To determine 
whether there is a connection between error and outcome, courts 
could ask whether there are plausible explanations consistent 
with innocence that the error prevented the jury from 
considering. In Pardo’s terms, this revised question gives courts a 
“vocabulary” with which to make reasoning about outcomes 
explicit.227 He suggests using “explanatory inferences” to “avoid 
the problem of pure subjectivity that affects confidence-based 
probability assessments.”228 Thus, one useful inquiry might be 
whether a story of the jury’s consideration of the case affected by 
the error makes more sense than one that does not. Reframing 
the inquiry along these lines would resolve, for example, the 
inconsistency between considering whether there is otherwise 
overwhelming evidence and whether an error contributed to the 
verdict in the harmless error calculus.229 
Put another way, correct application of the test for prejudice 
requires a reviewing court to “consider the opposite.” To borrow a 
term from management decision theory, one might view the 
possibility of different trial outcomes as “knowable unknowns” 
rather than “unknown unknowns.”230 When making a prospective 
decision, one can “imagine” a “known unknown” and should 
regard it as having a real possibility of occurring.231  
Merely recognizing that hindsight is clouded232 and “trying 
hard” to see around it does little to improve processing.233 
                                                                                                     
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1103. 
 229. See Vasquez v. United States, 635 F.3d 889, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(Hamilton, J., dissenting) (describing this inconsistency). 
 230. Alberto Feduzi & Jochen Runde, Uncovering Unknown Unknowns: 
Toward a Baconian Approach to Management Decision-Making, 124 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 268, 270 (2014). As Feduzi and Runde 
explain, in the case of a die toss, the known unknowns are the elementary 
events 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Id. The “unknown unknowns”—which are termed 
“Black Swans” when they go on to occur—would be ones “that the decision-
maker does not imagine and therefore does not even consider.” Id. An example 
here would be a seven-sided die and the event of rolling a 7. Id. 
 231. Id.  
 232. See Rachlinski, supra note 31, at 586–88 (“No matter how a judgment 
made in hindsight is restructured, the feeling that an outcome was both 
inevitable and predictable is impossible to avoid.”). 
 233. See Baruch Fischoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. 
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Decision-makers are oriented towards “unfoldings of the world 
described in sufficient detail to determine the relevant 
consequences of each of the possible courses of action.”234 But 
actively constructing a trial in which the error or the failure to 
disclose or perform did affect the verdict might mitigate some 
hindsight failures and further ensure correct placement of the 
burden of proof.235 The Supreme Court offered a useful potential 
structure for such decision-making in its most recent Brady 
decision.236 In Smith v. Cain,237 the Court concluded that the 
government cannot meets its burden of showing that a violation 
is immaterial if it only “offers a reason that the jury could have 
disbelieved [the undisclosed evidence], but gives us no confidence 
that it would have done so.”238 If courts were to review errors in 
context and, when uncertain, proceed as though they affected the 
verdict,239 integrated decision-making—that counts a different 
outcome as a real possibility—could emerge. 
                                                                                                     
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356 (1977) 
(“Even when told to do so, it is evidently extremely difficult to de-process so 
important a bit of information as the right answer, inadmissible evidence, or an 
act of aggression followed by mitigating circumstances.”); see also John C. 
Anderson, et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the 
Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993) (“Individuals tend to give 
higher relevance to negative factors (cues) when the outcome was negative and 
to give higher relevance to positive factors (cues) when the outcome was 
positive.”). 
 234. Feduzi & Runde, supra note 230, at 270. 
 235. See Neal J. Roese, Twisted Pair: Counterfactual Thinking and the 
Hindsight Bias, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING 
268 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004) (explaining that, although 
hindsight bias is “resistant to debiasing,” approaches involving considering 
alternatives have been effective because “if the occurring event cued its own 
causal chains, then considering the non-occurring event ought to accomplish the 
analogous result, thereby decreasing the bias”); see also Charles G. Lord et al., 
Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social Judgment, 47 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1239 (1984) (finding that “the cognitive 
strategy of considering opposite possibilities promote[s] impartiality”). See 
generally Michelle R. Nario & Nyla R. Branscombe, Comparison Processes in 
Hindsight and Causal Attribution, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1244 
(1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61 (2000). 
 236. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 434 (1995) (“We conclude that 
the uncertain judge should treat the error, not as if it were harmless, but as if it 
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B. Standards for Systemic Failures 
Finally, courts should pay particular attention to errors that 
relate to breaches of duty and symptoms of systemic failure.240 
Here, a quantitative approach, not in the probabilistic sense, but 
to draw bright lines, could supplement the holistic inquiry into 
error. For instance, certain objective markers of the adequacy of 
counsel—such as interviewing eyewitnesses and investigating 
exculpatory evidence—might help courts look past hindsight, 
despite the Strickland Court’s resistance to listing any 
“mechanical rules.”241  
The distinction between structural and non-structural errors 
already recognizes that some flaws in the trial compromise fair 
adjudication to such an extent that no amount of certainty about 
outcome justifies affirmance. Types of error that pervade the trial 
but fall outside these categories also warrant closer scrutiny. 
Prejudice is presumed, for example, when the court commands 
joint representation over a defendant’s objection.242 The 
reasoning goes that an inquiry into a claim of harmless error 
would “require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation” and 
thus is not “susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application.”243 
Yet hindsight about the impact of ineffective assistance of counsel 
requires the same unguided speculation. As with counsel 
constrained by joint representation, incompetent counsel might 
refrain from doing things, and the effect of that restraint on 
“options, tactics, and decisions” will not be apparent from the 
record.244  
Recent developments also suggest a potential hybrid category 
of semi-structural errors, with respect to which prejudice could be 
                                                                                                     
affected the verdict (i.e., as if it had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or 
influence in determining the jury’s verdict’).”); see also Edwards, supra note 10, 
at 1194 (concluding that “serious doubt” about whether a trial without the error 
would have produced a different result requires reversal). 
 240. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 56, at 1366 (“The overwhelming-evidence 
test ignores the argument that, even if conviction appears inevitable, there is a 
point at which an error becomes too great to condone as a matter of 
constitutional integrity and prosecutorial deterrence.”). 
 241. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).  
 242. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488 (1978). 
 243. Id. at 491. 
 244. Id. at 490–91. 
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presumed, though reversal would not be automatic. One reading 
of the Lafler and Frye extensions of the right to counsel is that 
clear violations of ex ante professional norms weigh more heavily 
than other errors. Some cases of ineffective assistance of counsel 
arise from strategic decisions or from generally inartful advocacy. 
But cases in which the deficient performance involves breaches of 
duty like the failure to communicate a plea offer, or neglecting to 
conduct pretrial mitigation investigation in a capital case, require 
an especially rigorous approach, one that expressly clears away 
hindsight blindness to improve accuracy.  
A similar argument applies to breaches of a prosecutor’s duty 
to disclose exculpatory evidence. As Judge Kozinski wrote in 
Olsen, prosecutors don’t fulfill Brady obligations because “courts 
don’t make them care.”245 If hindsight no longer shielded 
prosecutors from the consequences of withholding discovery, or 
defense lawyers from accountability for errors, they might care a 
great deal more about those requirements.246  
Even guided speculation done as thoughtfully as possible, 
however, is currently out of the reach of most habeas courts, who 
face claims that are often procedurally defaulted.247 State 
post-conviction review limits “the range of issues that can be 
raised on collateral attack” and also imposes “heightened burdens 
on defendants” because “finality interests are given greater 
prominence over concerns about wrongful convictions.”248 It is 
                                                                                                     
 245. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting); see also id. at 626 (“There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad 
in the land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588–
89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“An automatic application of the harmless 
error review in case after case, and for error after error, can only encourage 
prosecutors to subordinate the interest in respecting the Constitution to the 
ever-present and always powerful interest in obtaining a conviction in a 
particular case.”). 
 246. See Baer, supra note 75, at 5 (“[M]ost prosecutors and their offices 
remain fairly insulated from the prospect of liability.”). 
 247. The layers that separate a habeas petitioner from error review were 
recently restated by the Supreme Court in Davis v. Ayala, in which the majority 
concluded that post-conviction relief is available only where both the trial 
court’s error and the appellate court’s decision that the error was harmless are 
so deeply inconsistent with established precedent that no fair-minded jurist 
could agree. See 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015) (concerning the exclusion of 
defense counsel from Batson proceedings). 
 248. Findley & Scott, supra note 29, at 353. 
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harder still at the federal level, which involves “strict time limits 
and numerous procedural and substantive barriers” arising from 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.249 
Moreover, there is a circumstantial blind spot: Concealed 
evidence tends to stay that way, and ineffective assistance of 
counsel also requires some subsequent lawyer to uncover the 
evidence or strategy that prior counsel neglected.250  
The acuteness of the hindsight blindness problem stems as 
well from the interaction between these three categories of error. 
The discovery process fails to level the informational playing 
field, subpar counsel cannot correct for that disadvantage in the 
adversarial process, and reviewing courts are reluctant to retry 
cases of claimed error. One could view all of these structural 
impediments as a reason not to revisit hindsight standards. But 
perhaps they suggest instead that the danger of overvaluing 
errors and raising the reversal rate is not that high. Especially in 
the rare cases where defendants have access to post-conviction 
fact development and successfully uncover systemic failures like 
Brady violations and inadequate representation, a more rigorous 
review is warranted, through a clearer lens than the current 
hindsight standard. 
VII. Conclusion 
The undeniable existence of error in criminal adjudication—
which is often connected to cognitive failings—calls for 
reconsideration of the mechanisms available to reviewing courts 
for error correction. The inability to clearly see how discovery 
violations, deficient counsel, or evidentiary flaws affected a trial 
determination precludes close scrutiny of systemic failings. 
Actual change to the underlying standards themselves seems 
unlikely. Brady, Strickland, and Brecht are all fairly entrenched 
precedents. It is a useful step, however, to illuminate the problem 
of cognitive bias in applying those standards. More rigorous and 
                                                                                                     
 249. Id.  
 250. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 5, at 111 n.206 (“[S]uppression of 
exculpatory evidence is difficult to uncover. Absent discovery of the police and 
prosecution files, even after exoneration potential Brady violations may not 
come to light.”). 
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better-informed application could restore the role of reviewing 
courts as the safety valve in a process that has failed to correct 
itself. Precious few trials take place, and the ones that do occur 
also perform an important audit function for the criminal justice 
process. Trials expose investigative and prosecutorial tactics to 
both judicial and public review. Appellate reversals of convictions 
also send important messages about fair procedures. But if 
prosecutorial ethics, attorney performance, and evidentiary error 
remain behind a hindsight barrier and thus lie beyond the reach 
of reviewing courts, little will change despite empirical evidence 
of wrongful convictions and the most recent social science on 
accurate fact-finding. 
